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RETHINKING GUILT, JURIES, 
AND JEOPARDY 
George C. Thomas III* 
and Barry S. Pollack** 
INTRODUCTION 
Commentators have vigorously debated the fairness, as well as the 
ability, of jurors and juries.1 Dean Erwin Griswold once wrote: "The 
jury trial [in civil cases] is the apotheosis of the amateur. Why should 
anyone think that 12 persons brought in from the street, selected in 
various ways for their lack of general ability, should have any special 
capacity for deciding controversies between persons?"2 
It is easier to defend a critical role for juries in criminal cases. As 
the Supreme Court has noted, juries provide "an inestimable safeguard 
against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compli-
ant, biased, or eccentric judge."3 While this role seems self-evident, a 
difficult question lurks beneath the surface. What characteristics de-
fine a jury? One is, of course, that the jury must be impartial, a re-
quirement derived from the Constitution itself.4 Beyond impartiality, 
however, one strains to identify the inalienable characteristics of a 
jury. Does the Constitution require a minimum number of jurors in a 
criminal case? A guilty vote from a minimum percentage of the total 
number of jurors to convict a defendant? 
The answers to these questions must be affirmative. No one would 
consider a vote of 1-1 a jury verdict. As jury size increases, however, 
the questions become more difficult. The crux of the problem appears 
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1. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE .AMERICAN JURY 3-11 (1966) (providing 
broad outline of the debate over the use of the jury system). 
2. Id. at 5 (quoting 1962-1963 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL DEAN'S REPORT 5-6). 
3. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
4. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI. But cf. George C. Thomas III, Legal Skepticism and the Gravita-
tional Effect of Law, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 965, 978-82 (1991) (discussing the difficulty of as-
signing meaning to the "impartiality" requirement). 
1 
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in the Court's treatment of 9-3 and 5-1 verdicts. The Court has held 
the former, but not the latter, constitutional. 5 Does any principle -
other than the trite remark of Justice Rehnquist that "lines must be 
drawn somewhere"6-justify finding a distinction of constitutional 
magnitude between 9-3 and 5-1? Why must a six-member jury reach a 
unanimous verdict when a seventy-five percent margin is constitution-
ally acceptable in a twelve-member jury?7 And what about verdicts of 
8-4? 6-1? 
To seek a nonarbitrary answer to these questions, we will follow 
the advice of Gertrude Stein, who told a young Ernest Hemingway: 
"Begin over again and concentrate."8 We "begin over again" by re-
thinking the concept of guilt. After settling on a plausible mechanism 
for evaluating jury verdicts of guilty or not guilty, we construct statis-
tical models to compare the accuracy of various jury configurations. 
These models produce results consistent with the outcomes that the 
Court has reached by what appears to be a rather haphazard route.9 
We also argue, again based on our mechanism for evaluating ver-
dicts, that the Supreme Court has failed to extend the logic behind its 
jury configuration cases to the acquittal side of the balance. If, as our 
models show and the Court has held, a 9-3 verdict in favor of the state 
is sufficiently certain to justify a verdict of guilty,10 a 9-3 verdict in 
favor of the defendant is also sufficiently certain to require an acquit-
tal. In those jurisdictions that require jury unanimity, 11 a jury vote of 
9-3 for acquittal is a hung jury in form but, we believe, an acquittal in 
substance.12 If we are correct, a second trial for that offense would 
5. Compare Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (upholding 9-3 verdict) with Burch v. 
Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) (striking down 5-1 verdict). 
6. Burch, 441 U.S. at 137. 
7. The difference between 5-1 and 9-3 verdicts is the presence of six additional jurors who 
vote guilty by a 4-2 split. But why would adding six jurors who can manage only a 67% margin 
for guilt make the 9-3 verdict constitutionally superior to the 5-1 verdict? For an answer, see 
infra text accompanying note 107. 
8. CARLOS BAKER, ERNESr HEMINGWAY: A LIFE STORY 87 (1969). Although Baker does 
not report that the remark offended Hemingway, Hemingway savaged Stein many years later in a 
posthumously published essay recounting his version of the conversation. See ERNESr HEMING· 
WAY, Miss Stein Instructs, in A MOVEABLE FEAST 11-21 (1964). 
9. We do not mean to imply that the Court has never scrutinized statistical models. See 
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231-36 (1978). Rather, we mean to say that the Court has never 
relied on a consistent principle to arrive at answers to these questions. Thus, we were surprised 
when we first performed our statistical tests and found that they tended to confirm the Court's 
jurisprudential outcomes. 
10. The Court has held that 9-3 votes to convict possess sufficient accuracy and integrity to 
function as criminal verdicts. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 360 (1972). 
11. Most states still require unanimity for criminal verdicts, as does the federal system. See 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b), 31 (requiring 12-member juries as well as unanimity). 
12. In essence, we argue for a concept of "de facto" acquittal. See Burks v. United States, 
437 U.S. 1 (1978) (holding that an appellate reversal based on insufficient evidence is functionally 
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violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
I. EVALUATING VERDICTS 
The purpose of a mechanism for deciding guilt is to impose punish-
ment only on those who deserve it. This goal raises two questions. 
First, who decides? Second, how can an observer evaluate whether the 
decisionmaker was right or wrong? 
Although citizen juries played a role in the English criminal pro-
cess at least as far back as 1201 A.D., 13 their role initially was limited 
to screening cases, much like the present-day grand jury. Thus, a jury 
would decide whether to hold the accused for the guilt-determining 
phase, which might be battle or ordeal.14 Battle on an accusation of 
felony ended in death for the accused if he lost - the offender would 
perish either in the battle or from immediate hanging.15 Ordeal con-
sisted principally of trial by fire and water, 16 which required the ac-
cused (and sometimes the accuser)17 to walk through fire, carry red-
hot iron, plunge his hand or arm into boiling water, or be thrown into 
a pool of water. 18 
The premise underlying both battle and ordeal as guilt-determin-
ing mechanisms was that "God would always interpose miraculously 
to vindicate the guiltless."19 Thus, the innocent defendant who car-
ried hot iron or cast his arm into boiling water would not show evi-
dence of burns. A perverse twist on this theory explains the water 
ordeal. If the accused "floated therein, without any action of swim-
indistinguishable from an acquittal by the trier of fact); see also George C. Thomas III, An Ele-
gant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 827 (developing concept of "verdict 
equivalence"). 
13. See, e.g., 1 SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1 (Frederic w. Maitland 
ed., 1888) (case 1from1201) (mentioning jurors); see also 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC 
W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 598-99 (2d 
ed. 1899); XIV THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CuSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND 
CoMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL 172-75 (G.D.G. Hall ed. & trans., 1965) (Book XIV, 1-3); 1 
W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 312-21 (4th ed. 1927). 
14. See, e.g., 1 SELDEN SOCIETY, supra note 13, at 1 (case 1 from 1201) ("The jurors being 
asked, say that they suspect him of [the crime]; the whole county likewise suspects him. Let him 
purge himself by water [ordeal] •.•. "). 
15. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *346-48 (1854). Battles became rare by 
the late thirteenth century. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 13, at 633 (noting that the 
average annual number of battles probably did not exceed twenty by this time); M.J. Russell, 
Trials By Battle and the Appeals of Felony, 1 J. LEGAL HIST. 135, 154 (1980) (dating the last 
battle as 1456). 
16. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at *342-43. 
17. See 1 SELDEN SOCIETY, supra note 13, at 10 (case 24). 
18. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at *342-44. 
19. Id. at *342; see also 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 13, at 310 (ordeal premised on notion 
that "God will intervene by a sign or a miracle"). 
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ming, it was deemed an evidence of his guilt; but if he s[a]nk he was 
acquitted."20 Here, apparently, the theory was that a person could 
only float without swimming through Satan's intervention, and Satan 
would spare only guilty defendants. 
With the dawning of the Renaissance, however, Western culture 
gradually ceased seeing the hand of God or Satan in every physical 
event, and the role of citizen juries was extended from screening de-
fendants for trial to determining guilt.21 As long as God was making 
the decision, believers did not accept the possibility of error. Once the 
ultimate decision rested in the hands of citizens, however, error be-
came possible. The difficult, and usually unappreciated, question is 
how error can occur. 
The most superficially plausible way for error to occur is to con-
sider guilt as an empirical determination - the only judgment that the 
relevant facts could sustain. If an evaluator external to the jury22 
knew the relevant facts, she could then judge whether the jury reached 
the right result.23 But if the relevant facts can sustain only one ver-
dict, how can the jury reach a contrary result? One answer is that the 
rules of evidence and procedure may have denied the jury some of the 
relevant facts, but this gets us nowhere. We seek to determine whether 
juries consistently reach the correct result within the parameters of the 
legal system, not whether the legal system perfectly identifies factors 
20. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at *343-44. Blackstone was critical of the rationale un-
derlying the water ordeal. He wrote, "[o]ne can not but be astonished at the folly and impiety of 
pronouncing a man guilty, unless he was cleared by a miracle, and of expecting that all the 
powers of nature should be suspended by an immediate interposition of Providence to save the 
innocent, whenever it was presumptuously required." Id. at *344. 
21. See WILLIAM s. MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA, A CoMMENTARY ON THE GREAT 
CHARTER OF KING JOHN 136 (2d ed. 1914). 
22. Judges often act as the trier of fact in criminal cases, either because a defendant has 
waived the right to trial by jury or because the offense is "petty" and does not implicate that 
right. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (plurality) (holding that offenses punishable 
by six months or less do not require trial by jury); THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMISSION ON LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE 
SOCIETY 262, Figure 5 (1967) (noting roughly twice as many bench trials for FBI index crimes as 
jury trials in 1965). Because our concern lies with jury configurations, however, we will limit our 
discussion to jury verdicts. 
23. See Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict 
Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 
247, 250 (1990) (noting that "lack of a truth criterion does not mean that verdicts are neither 
accurate nor inaccurate; it merely indicates limits to our knowledge about particular cases"). 
Appellate courts review convictions to determine whether they are based on sufficient evidence. 
See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 (1982); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978). This func-
tion resembles that of the external evaluator described in the text, though procedural rules that 
effectively create a presumption of correctness for trial verdicts make it simpler. See Jackson v. 
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (phrasing "relevant question" for federal habeas review of 
convictions as "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecu-
tion, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt"). 
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indicating guilt. Thus, our external evaluator should know only what 
the jury knew. 
Within that limitation, and assuming guilt is an empirical concept, 
a jury could make a mistake about guilt in the same way that a mathe-
matician makes a mistake proving a theorem. That empirical ques-
tions have only one right answer does not mean every attempt to 
derive the answer is right. The difficulty, of course, is to establish a 
method capable of evaluating the attempt to derive the right answer. 
Guilt as an empirical concept seems intuitively plausible. Charles 
Nesson has argued that public acceptance of a verdict and its behavi-
orial message requires a belief that a verdict is a statement about what 
happened.24 For example, viewe~s of the videotaped beating of Rod-
ney King may believe that they were in a position to conclude that the 
jury verdict was wrong. But practical and epistemological problems 
abound. Take a simple case where the only issue is whether defendant 
Y performed act X. Since no way exists to go back in time and observe 
whether Y did X, the most the legal system can do is gather evidence 
about what happened in the past and provide that evidence to a 
factfinder.25 In most cases, the external evaluator will not have access 
to a videotape of the relevant encounter and must rely on human testi-
mony recalling distant events. This practical limitation typically re-
quires judgments about witness credibility before the "fact" about Xis 
known, a task our system assigns to the jury. 
More fundamentally, even if we permit the evaluator to judge cred-
ibility in determining the "fact" about X, no particular reason exists to 
prefer the evaluator's conclusion to that of the jury. Whoever seeks to 
evaluate the judgment of the jury stands in no higher relation to the 
"truth" than does the jury.26 Viewers of the Rodney King videotape 
could justifiably assert that they were surprised by the verdict in that 
case or that they would have voted differently, but to assert that the 
24. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of 
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1357, 1362 (1985) ("Projecting the verdict as such forges a link 
between the judicial account of the defendant's transgression and our own behavior."). 
25. In many cases, the issue is not so clear-cut as whether Y did X. It might be, instead, Y's 
state of mind when Y did X or the inferences that might be drawn from Y's having done X or 
whether Y was justified in doing X. Or it may be that no witness saw Y do x; and jurors are 
asked to make inferences from other facts to determine whether Y did X. In cases where the 
issue is state of mind or the availability of defenses, even a time-traveling observer would be hard 
pressed to pronounce the jury's decision "right" or "wrong." Of course, we could grant omni-
science to the time-traveling observer, but that would return us to the pre-Renaissance days of 
deferring to the judgment of a deity. 
26. When the state permits appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence, see supra note 
23, the state places appellate judges procedurally closer to the "truth." But procedural relation 
to the truth is not the same as epistemological truth. 
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jury was wrong implies a privileged access to truth.27 
Thus, no math-like method for verifying a jury verdict exists. Any 
"truth" about guilt that exists in the universe is undiscoverable. The 
legal system can attempt to uncover its errors only by performing a 
post hoc review of its fallible human actors. 28 We can avoid epistemo-
logical difficulty, however, by adopting a positivist view of guilt: guilt 
is what the system (the sovereign) says it is.29 Defendants are guilty if 
found guilty.30 
The narrow sense of this positivist conception holds that guilt or 
lack of guilt is simply the outcome of a complex process that limits the 
evidence that a jury can hear, requires proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt and a certain quality of representation of defendants, disquali-
fies some citizens from jury service, provides for the appeal of convic-
tions (but not acquittals), and has a host of other rules that impede or 
facilitate the task of prosecuting individual cases. The final result of 
this elaborate process is, in a positivist sense, the reality about guilt.31 
While the narrow positivist conception of guilt is both practical 
and epistemologically sound, its narrowness renders it unsatisfactory 
as a framework for evaluating jury verdicts. Indeed, the compass is so 
27. Some readers of an earlier draft insisted that viewers of the tape could justifiably con· 
elude that the jury was wrong because it was biased. But we believe that to conclude the jury was 
biased presupposes that it was wrong. If it was right, why would a viewer infer bias? Moreover, 
basing a judgment about the jury decision on the videotape also presents a practical difficulty: 
the tape was not the only evidence presented at trial. See Morton I. Greenberg (Circuit Judge, 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals), Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1992, at A28 (noting 
that "those who have declared that the verdict was wrong have not judged the same case as did 
the jury"). The external evaluator discussed in the text must have access to all of the evidence 
that the jury considered. Even so, the epistemological difficulty remains. 
28. See Barry S. Pollack, Note, Death Penalty Query: Is "Desert" Served?, 44 RUTGERS L. 
REv. (forthcoming 1992) ("Certainly our criminal justice system is filled with errors. Jurors can 
err in their findings of fact. Judges can err in their legal determinations and in the exercise of 
discretion. Witnesses can err in their recall. Lawyers can err in their strategy."). We think it 
too late in the day to return to the idea that an omniscient evaluator could make the ultimate 
judgment, as in the twelfth century battle and ordeal. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying 
text. 
29. See RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO 
EVIDENCE 148 (2d ed. 1982): 
The law is too practical to concern itself with the nice epistemological question of whether 
the truth can ever be known. It assumes that it can, and it assumes that the way to find 
truth is to present [to] the jury ... evidence which bears on the issue to be decided. 
Id. at 148. 
30. At one level, this statement merely expresses a truism. A defendant is never guilty as a 
legal proposition in the absence of a verdict. See Thomas, supra note 12, at 835. Indeed, regard-
less of the quantity of evidence, the jury is free to "nullify" the evidence and vote not guilty. See 
Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say "No," 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168 (1972). 
But we mean the statement in the text to offer a more fundamental, positivist proposition - that 
the system outcome is the truth about guilt in every sense of the term. 
31. See Nesson, supra note 24, at 1367-68 (calling this a "more complex and sophisticated 
understanding of the meaning of a verdict" that entails "no judgment about the underlying fac· 
tual event"). 
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narrow that it enables no evaluation of the outcome, as opposed to the 
process. Once the highest court in the jurisdiction affirms a convic-
tion, the defendant is guilty, and talking about whether the verdict is 
correct is incoherent. 
Of course, we can use mathematical models to evaluate the process 
even under a narrow positivist conception of guilt. For example, sup-
pose juries deliberated to pick a number between one and three. Then, 
if the defendant guessed the number, the verdict would be not guilty; 
otherwise the verdict would be guilty. The conviction rate would be 
67%, similar to what our criminal justice system produces now.32 But 
this process would not produce the "truth" about guilt as the system 
currently contemplates that concept, in part because the current pro-
cess is designed to produce a judgment about the strength of the ad-
missible evidence of guilt. 
We can adjust this "guess-game" method of reaching a verdict for 
the strength of the state's case and thus illustrate another problem. 
Assume a trial is conducted under the current rules, nine of twelve 
jurors vote guilty, and the other three vote not guilty. In response to 
the 25% not guilty vote, the foreperson of the jury could select a 
number between one and four instead of one and three. The result is 
an acquittal if the defendant can guess the number. The defendant in 
this example has a 25% chance of being acquitted, a probability that 
reflects the fraction of jurors voting in favor of acquittal and thus the 
strength of the evidence presented. The difficulty with the evidence-
adjusted "guess game," even under a positivist conception of guilt, is 
that the outcome ultimately depends on random probability. Guilt, 
whether viewed as a positivist or empirical notion, requires an individ-
ual judgment about an individual case. 33 
Once an acceptable process is in place, however, the narrow posi-
tivist conception posits that the outcome of the process answers the 
question whether the defendant is guilty. If this is the best way to 
conceptualize guilt, then asking whether the jury verdict was substan-
32. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note l, at 58. 
33. See S~ S. Nagel & Marian Neef, Deductive Modeling to Determine an Optimum Jury 
Size and Fraction Required to Convict, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 933, 936 (If "in effect the fate of 
defendants in criminal cases would be decided by the flip of a coin, [the result] would be uncon-
stitutional."). Other process aspects of the jury system are important in reaching a positivist 
judgment about guilt. Consider the role of jury deliberation. If deliberation were not important, 
the following method of reaching a verdict would presumably be acceptable. Members of the 
jury are secretly numbered before trial and a computer randomly generates a number in the 
range of the size of the jury. While all the jurors would hear the case, only the juror who corre-
sponds to the generated number would decide the case. Thus, as in the example in the text, if 
nine out of twelve jurors thought the defendant was guilty, the defendant would have a 25% 
chance of being acquitted. 
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tively correct is incoherent. But this conception seems intuitively 
wrong - we do want to be able to critique the substance of the verdict 
in the Rodney King case rather than merely content ourselves with 
observing that the legal system works. Indeed, the concept of justice 
seems to entail an evaluation of the result, not just the process.34 
Can guilt be conceived in a way that avoids the practical and epis-
temological problems of empirical guilt without accepting the ultimate 
verdict as inevitably correct? One answer lies in a broader version of 
positivism. Guilt might be what the sovereign, broadly construed, 
says it is. As both H.L.A. Hart and John Austin noted, the sovereign 
in a democracy is ultimately the electorate.35 A broader version of 
positivism, then, suggests that guilt is what the electorate would de-
cide in any given case. Viewed in this light, a jury is simply a sample 
of the larger universe of the electorate, and a jury verdict can be com-
pared to the result the electorate would have reached had it judged the 
case. 
In a similar vein, Ronald J. Allen has observed, "The jury system 
is based upon a relativistic or communitarian theory of knowledge. 
Community consensus determines what is true for purposes of after 
the fact determinations."36 This broad positivist conception of guilt 
comports with our societal preoccupation with sensational jury trials 
- for example, the trials of William Kennedy Smith, Mike Tyson, and 
the officers accused of beating Rodney King.37 One reading of this 
public attention is that society reserves for itself the ultimate decision 
on the defendant's guilt, 38 with the jury merely functioning as a conve-
nient way of attempting to express the societal judgment. Thus, re-
porters asked many people concerning these three trials, "Did you 
agree with the verdict?" Implicit in this question is the notion that the 
34. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 177 (1986). 
35. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 72 (1961) (attributing this view to JOHN 
AUSTIN, Lecture VJ, in THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 241 (London, John 
Murray 1832)). 
36. Ronald J. Allen, Unexplored Aspects of the Theory of the Right to Trial by Jury, 66 
WASH. U. L.Q. 33, 38 (1988). 
37. Cable News Network, for example, telecast much of the trial of William Kennedy Smith. 
See Steven Brill, How the Willie Smith Show Changed America, AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 3. 
Nor is this societal preoccupation a new phenomenon. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 
51 (1932) (noting that trial of black defendants charged with the rape of two white girls "took 
place in an atmosphere of tense, hostile, and excited public sentiment"). 
38. See, e.g., Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975) (describing trial of defendant 
whose filmed confession had been telecast as a "hollow formality,'' noting that "the real trial had 
occurred when tens of thousands of people, in a community of 150,000, had seen and heard the 
defendant admit his guilt before the cameras") (referring to Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 
(1963)); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727 (1961) (noting that almost 90% of 430 prospective 
jurors "entertained some opinion as to guilt - ranging in intensity from mere suspicion to abso-
lute certainty"). 
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defendants' "true" guilt depends on society's view rather than on the 
actual jury decision. 39 
Other reasons support the positivist argument that society40 is the 
appropriate benchmark for evaluating whether a trial jury reached the 
"right" verdict. First, society bears the systemic consequences of jury 
verdicts - incorrect acquittals free guilty defendants while incorrect 
convictions reduce confidence in the process. The entity that bears the 
systemic consequences of trial jury decisions ought to provide the ulti-
mate standard by which these decisions are evaluated.41 Second, the 
society-as-jury concept parallels the Greek understanding of juries. 
Some Greek juries were as large as 1001 citizens,42 a discernible per-
centage of the total citizenry. Today, of course, a jury of twelve is not 
a discernible percentage of even the smallest state's adult citizenry. 
Moreover, the Greek juries voted without deliberation or discussion, 43 
suggesting that guilt was a societal determination and that the jurors 
were exercising society's right directly rather than as representatives of 
a much larger group. 
Our working hypothesis is that "true" guilt means nothing more, 
or less, than the judgment that society as a whole would reach in a 
given case. We may, therefore, evaluate verdicts by considering the 
trial jury a sample of society. Obviously, for practical reasons, soci-
ety's judgment cannot function in individual cases as a finding of guilt, 
but it can serve as a frame of reference for evaluating jury :findings. 
We recognize that using society as a mechanism for ascertaining 
"true" guilt is somewhat unsatisfying. Society is simply a larger (in-
39. The question "did you agree?" is also consistent with a view of guilt as an empirical fact 
ascertainable by an external evaluator; thus, the person to whom the question is addressed as-
sumes the role of external evaluator. While this view is plausible, it entails the epistemological 
problems discussed in the text, supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. Why should someone 
external to the jury - even a legal expert - be better able to perceive the empirical truth about 
guilt than the jurors present at the trial? 
40. We intend society to mean the adult members of society and thus be coextensive with 
electorate. 
41. Society can already demonstrate its interest in systemic consequences of the criminal 
process through politics. If a societal consensus arose that too many innocent persons were being 
convicted, legislation increasing the burden of demonstrating guilt would likely follow. Cf 
Thomas, supra note 4 (discussing role of societal consensus in shaping judicial interpretations of 
law); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) (noting value that society places on avoiding 
erroneous convictions). Similarly, if a consensus arose that too many guilty defendants were 
being acquitted, one could expect legislation permitting nonunanimous verdicts or otherwise eas-
ing the state's burden for conviction. If the consensus were powerful enough, a constitutional 
amendment limiting defendants' rights might result. 
42. The number of jurors ranged from 201 to 1001, depending on the nature of the case. See 
MELVYN B. ZERMAN, BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT- INSIDE THE AMERICAN JURY SYS-
TEM 16 (1981). Zerman concludes that "[s]omething was lost when the size of juries dwindled 
from 1001 to 12." Id. at 18. 
43. Id. at 17. 
10 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 91:1 
deed, the largest possible) jury panel. Why should reference to a 
larger panel produce the "truth" about guilt? Our only answer is that 
empirical guilt is unverifiable. Without recourse to the broad positiv-
ist conception of guilt as society's judgment, no standard exists for 
determining which jury verdicts are erroneous. Ultimately, we believe 
that deciding which jury configurations are likely to produce verdicts 
consistent with society's judgment is a more satisfying basis for juris-
prudence than the anemic doctrine that "lines must be drawn 
somewhere."44 
We will briefly explore the Court's rationales for evaluating jury 
configurations and will then, by means of the laws of statistics, com-
pare certain jury configuration verdicts with the verdict that the entire 
society would reach. Our goal is to provide statistical proof of which 
jury configurations promise to constitute reasonably reliable samples 
of society as a whole. 
II. JURY CONFIGURATION RATIONALES 
In a jury trial, the fate of an accused usually hinges on the factual, 
moral, and intuitive decisions of six to twelve people. 45 As noted ear-
lier, the U.S. Supreme Court has struggled with rules governing jury 
size and with the requirement of unanimity or, alternatively, the mini-
mal fractions necessary to convict. 46 Without recounting the struggle, 
the import of the Supreme Court cases on the issues of size and re-
quired majority is that jury votes of 9-3 and 6-0 satisfy the Constitu-
tion while jury votes of 5-0 and 5-1 do not. 47 One Justice has stated in 
dicta that a 7-5 conviction would be constitutionally deficient.48 The 
44. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 137 (1979). 
45. Jurors are not limited to factfinding. See KAI.VEN & ZEISEL, supra note I, at 495: 
[T]he jury imports its values into the law not so much by open revolt in the teeth of the law 
and the facts, although in a minority of cases it does do this, as by what we termed the 
liberation hypothesis. The jury, in the guise of resolving doubts about the issues of fact, 
gives reign to its sense of values. It will not often be doing this consciously; as the equities of 
the case press, the jury may, as one judge put it, "hunt for doubts." Its war with the law is 
thus both modest and subtle. The upshot is that when the jury reaches a different conclu· 
sion from the judge on the same evidence, it does so not because it is a sloppy or inaccurate 
finder offacts, but because it gives recognition to values which fall outside the official rules. 
Id. at 495; see also United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984) (holding that inconsistent jury 
verdicts on multiple counts are beyond constitutional review, thereby giving juries the power to 
compromise when they are unsure whether the defendant is guilty); United States v. Dougherty, 
473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing power of jury to disregard both uncontradicted evi-
dence and the instructions of a judge in order to acquit). 
46. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. 
47. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (approving 9-3); Williams v. Florida, 399 
U.S. 78 (1970) (approving 6-0); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (rejecting 5-0); Burch v. 
Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) (rejecting 5-1). If 9-3 verdicts are constitutional, obviously ver-
dicts of 10-2 and 11-1 are permissible. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972). 
48. See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 366 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Our models clearly vindicate 
October 1992] Guilt, Juries, and Jeopardy 11 
rationale for drawing these lines begins with the premise that the pur-
pose of a jury trial is to act as a "safeguard against the corrupt or 
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric 
judge."49 The Court found, quite reasonably, that a six-member jury 
could adequately serve this purpose. 50 
But the Court was forced to seek a complementary rationale when, 
eight years later, it faced the issue of five-member juries in Ballew v. 
Georgia. 51 Why would five-member juries not also safeguard against 
prosecutorial and judicial failings? One reason might be the greater 
risk of reaching an erroneous verdict, but the Court principally relied 
on empirical data regarding jury dynamics.52 These studies suggest 
that decreasing the size of a jury diminishes the effectiveness of its 
deliberation - greater inconsistencies develop, 53 the number of hung 
juries decreases, and minority viewpoints disappear from a majority of 
juries.54 
Despite Ballew's focus on jury dynamics, we believe that risk of 
error lay at the heart of the Court's rationale. The Court's concern 
with deliberation dynamics, fewer hung juries, and minority view-
points adds up to the principle that a jury should express views that 
are "truly representative of the community."55 Thus, the concern im-
plicit in the Court's disapproval of small juries is that they will reach a 
verdict inconsistent with the verdict the community would reach. 
This understanding of Ballew meshes with our conclusion in Part I 
that jury configurations must provide reliable samples of society as a 
whole because society constitutes the only relevant standard for deter-
mining "true" guilt. 
Varying the size and vote requirements of a jury obviously affects 
its ability to serve as a representative sample of society. The mathe-
matical law of large numbers indicates that increasing sample sizes 
Justice Blackmun'sjudgment on this point. See infra Table 3 (disclosing 29.1% risk of error for 
7-5 vote as lower of two estimates). 
49. Williams, 399 U.S. at 100 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)). 
50. See 399 U.S. at 103. 
51. 435 U.S. 223 (1978). 
52. See 435 U.S. at 232-33. The Court did mention that, as jury size decreases, the risk of 
convicting an innocent defendant increases. 435 U.S. at 234. For sources of empirical data uti-
lized by the Court, see 435 U.S. at 231-32 n.10. 
53. For example, smaller juries produce more extreme compromises. 435 U.S. at 235. 
54. 435 U.S. at 236-37. 
55. See Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
(1986) (holding that prosecutors may not systematically discriminate by race during jury selec-
tion); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (holding that jury venires must be drawn from a 
fair cross-section of the community). 
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simultaneously increases the accuracy of representation.56 For exam-
ple, suppose one attempted to determine the average height of adults 
in a community where the true average is five feet, eight inches. For 
the scientific observer, the likelihood of making precise estimates in-
creases as the sample size grows. The first individual randomly sam-
pled might be six feet tall, the second person six feet, four inches. As 
more people are measured, however, the average will approach five 
feet, eight inches. Obviously, once the entire community is sampled, 
no error can exist, and the average of the sample will be five feet, eight 
inches.57 
When guilt is the issue, each subset of society sampled with respect 
to a particular case may differ, but a poll of the entire society will 
achieve the same result every time, thereby providing consistency.58 
For example, if three jury panels hear the same evidence, one may vote 
guilty, one not guilty, and one may deadlock. But the vote of the en-
tire society can produce only one result. 
We believe that, to this point, we have made a tenable case that 
"true" guilt is only what society would determine and that the risk of 
error in making this determination explains the Court's concern with 
the size and vote requirements of the jury. Next, we will discuss the 
concept of "what society would determine." It is not as easy a concept 
as it first appears. 
III. CONTROLLING PERCENTAGES OF SOCIETY 
We have argued that guilt is what society says it is, a judgment 
that the entire society would reach on the merits of an individual case. 
The next step is to determine what voting percentage of society should 
constitute its judgment. Because that percentage controls the meaning 
of guilt under our theory, we will refer to it as the controlling 
percentage. 
An infinite number of possible controlling percentages exists. We 
begin by rejecting unanimity. While unanimity might be appropriate, 
or at least practicable, for trial juries, it would effectively abolish guilt 
if required of the entire society. At the other end of the spectrum, any 
56. This mathematical principle first appeared in Jakob Bernoulli's 1713 treatise, Ars Conjec-
tandi. See CARL B. BOYER, A HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS 459 (1968). It holds true, as a 
statistical principle, only when the sample is drawn randomly. 
57. Height sampling is offered here to enable the reader to envision the impact of the law of 
large numbers. Obviously, the height example does not pose the probabilistic/metaphysical 
problem that arises from guilt determinations. 
58. Of course, as time passes the composition of society changes. Likewise, opinions of what 
constitutes "true" guilt in any given case could change. Nevertheless, society's judgment and the 
definition of "true" guilt are always the same at any given time. 
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percentage less than 50% seems insufficient to constitute a societal 
judgment of guilt. But perhaps one vote over 50% would be sufficient. 
We will refer to this theory as "majority control." Our democratic 
structure supports majority control as a guilt-defining theory.59 His-
torically, in democratic societies, at least a simple majority of jurors 
had to vote guilty in order to convict a defendant. 60 Socrates was con-
victed by a vote of something like 280-22161 - 56% to 44% - pursu-
ant to the Greeks' simple majority definition of guilt. 
A simple majority definition of guilt appears to raise troublesome 
questions. Assume a society of 200,000,000 adults who vote only on 
the merits of criminal cases;62 defendantA is deemed guilty because he 
receives 100,000,001 guilty votes while defendant B is deemed not 
guilty because she receives only 100,000,000 guilty votes.63 Are con-
stitutional or general fairness principles violated when a difference of 
one vote out of 200,000,000 determines guilt? A due process argument 
suggests itself: if identically situated defendants are acquitted nearly 
as often as convicted when indistinguishably prosecuted before ran-
domly selected juries, enforcement of any guilty verdict appears 
arbitrary. 
The premise of this due process argument fails. An observer can-
not know whether A and B are similarly situated until a judgment is 
reached about the concept of guilt. If majority control is the appropri-
ate definition of guilt, then A and B are not similarly situated, and the 
one-vote societal majority therefore does not offend due process 
concerns. 
The relevant question is whether any principle could justify defin-
ing guilt as a concurrence of greater than 50% of society. We are not 
concerned here with the risk of error that any small sample may not 
accurately represent the larger universe; this concern could obviously 
59. See Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 89, 89 (1988). 
60. See ZERMAN, supra note 42, at 17 (noting simple majority and secret ballot attributes of 
Greek system). 
61. See PLATO, THE LAST DAYS OF SOCRATES 192 n.34 (Hugh Tredennick trans., 1969). 
Plato does not supply a tally of the vote, but Socrates notes that a thirty-vote swing would have 
secured his acquittal. THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO, THE APOLOGY 401, 418 (B. Jowett trans., 
1937). Several scholars place the jury's number at 501 to reflect Greek custom. See THOMAS C. 
BRICKHOUSE & NICHOLAS D. SMITH, SOCRATES ON TRIAL 26 (1989). 
62. Our argument is premised on jurors' deciding a case only on the merits. In real cases, 
some jurors might be influenced by the defendant's race, ethnicity, appearance, and so forth. We 
mean to exclude all factors not relevant to the defendant's guilt by assuming that the jurors, 
whether 200,000,000 or six, consider only the merits of the case. 
63. We assume here that a tie vote fails to establish guilt because it is one less than a simple 
majority. 
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justify requiring small sample verdicts to be greater than 50%.64 In-
stead, we are defining guilt by the judgment of society. Assume, for a 
moment, a system that premised guilt on a finding by a supermajority 
standard of 67%. Presumably, the rationale for preferring this to ma-
jority control would be to decrease the likelihood of convicting inno-
cent people. But we cannot know that we are convicting innocent 
people until we have a definition of guilt. Thus, concern about con-
victing too many innocent people cannot be used to define guilt. 
Perhaps the rationale can be restated: a supermajority controlling 
percentage would reduce the incidence of guilt and indulge a quasi-
presumption in favor of innocence. While true, that principle does not 
seem susceptible to limitation. If 67% is a good way to reduce the 
incidence of guilt, then 75% is better and 90% is still better and, of 
course, 100% is the best of all. 
Some may believe that a supermajority is necessary to effectuate 
the constitutional standard of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt."6S 
While this argument appears to disconnect the supermajority issue 
from the question of "too much guilt," it also runs into trouble. Re-
quiring jurors to find defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt de-
scribes the reasoning process individual jurors should use; the 
evidentiary burden is theoretically unrelated to the question of what 
voting majority best defines guilt. 66 
Moreover, the practical question of what voting majority would be 
equivalent to proof beyond a reasonable doubt is thorny. Why should 
67% or even 75% be sufficient to constitute proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt? Giving effect to the reasonable doubt standard by requiring a 
supermajority vote of society would tend to make guilty verdicts rare 
events.67 Finally, the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt argument ulti-
64. See infra Part IV. 
65. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in 
criminal cases as part of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause). 
66. The Court rejected the evidentiary burden argument in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 
356 (1972), by approving a 9-3 guilty verdict despite the contention that three votes for acquittal 
"demonstrate that guilt was not in fact beyond a reasonable doubt." 406 U.S. at 362. The Court 
concluded "that verdicts rendered by nine out of 12 jurors are not automatically invalidated by 
the disagreement of the dissenting three." 406 U.S. at 363. 
67. One reader of a draft of this paper argued that the existence of one million not guilty 
votes out of two hundred million total votes would cause him to conclude that a reasonable 
doubt existed. But the chance of obtaining a societal vote (on any issue) of 99.5% strikes us as 
extremely low. A certain percentage of society will, we believe, always act as contrarians; in 
deciding guilt, a few would credit testimony or defenses that most of us would reject while others 
would impose a standard of absolute certainty, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, on 
the state. Moreover, our society-as-;jury could not deliberate, further increasing the likelihood 
that votes approaching unanimity would be extremely rare. While we do not know what per-
centage required for guilt would make societal votes of guilty acceptably common, it would prob-
ably have to be sufficiently low to accommodate millions of not guilty votes. 
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mately does not succeed in disconnecting the rationale for a 
supermajority from the question of "too much guilt." The contention 
is premised on a concern with convicting only those whose guilt is 
manifest. 
We thus have difficulty conceiving of guilt by any standard other 
than majority control. But one value of our statistical methodology is 
its applicability to any chosen controlling standard. The reader may 
disagree with our preference for majority control; if so, she may apply 
any percentage she wishes and come up with statistical judgments of 
the various jury configurations that are quite different from those pro-
duced by a majority control standard. We will next develop some jury 
models and use statistical principles to determine the risk of misrepre-
senting society posed by various permutations of jury dimensions. We 
will use both the majority control definition of guilt and an alternate 
controlling fraction of two thirds in these models.68 Under the two 
thirds control model, society would have to vote guilty by two thirds 
or more before a defendant would be deemed guilty. 69 
IV. JURY MODELS 
Ethical principles forbid observing actual juries while they deliber-
ate; 70 jury models thus play a major role in predicting and evaluating 
verdicts. 71 This section will construct two basic jury models, the 
"Close-Call-But-Innocent Defendant" Model and the "Sample Accu-
racy" Model. The figures and conclusions generated in this section 
permit comparisons between variations in jury sizes and in fractions 
required to convict. 
68. In our jury models, both the majority control and two-thirds control theories refer to 
society, not actual juries. 
69. A reason for selecting two thirds as the supermajority standard is the significant role this 
fraction plays in the Constitution. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (requiring two-thirds vote to 
expel a member of each house); id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (requiring two-thirds vote to override a 
presidential veto); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (requiring quorum of two thirds of the states for a presi-
dential runoff); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring two-thirds vote of Senate to concur in treaties 
made by the President); id. art. V (requiring two-thirds vote in both houses or concurrence of 
two thirds of state legislatures to propose constitutional amendments); id. amend. XII (requiring 
two thirds of the states to form a quorum for conducting presidential elections); id. amend. XIV, 
§ 3 (requiring two thirds of both houses to remove bar to political office implemented against 
former office holders who have been guilty of rebellion or insurrection); id. amend. XXV, § 4 
(requiring two-thirds vote to bar the President's return to office after invocation of the disability 
provision in amendment). 
70. While we suspect this comment needs no amplification or justification, consider that an 
observation must either be known or unknown to the jurors. If known, the fact of observation 
would potentially contaminate the deliberation. If it were unknown, the privacy of the jurors 
would be violated. Kalven and Zeisel avoided these problems by questioning jurors after they 
had reached a verdict. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 1, at 482. 
71. For a discussion on requirements and objectives of jury models, see Nagel & Neef, supra 
note 33. 
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A. The Close-Call Defendant Model 
In Ballew v. Georgia, 72 the Supreme Court admonished that 
"[w]hen the case is close, and the guilt or innocence of the defendant is 
not readily apparent, a properly functioning jury system will insure 
evaluation by the sense of the community and will also tend to insure 
accurate factfinding."73 The Ballew Court accorded the "greatest 
value" of the right to a jury trial to these "close-call" prosecutions. 74 
A system that too frequently convicts close-call-but-innocent defend-
ants is both inaccurate and, apparently under Ballew, 
unconstitutional. 
By adopting a close-call model, we avoid the problem Stuart Nagel 
and Marian Neef created in the Independent-Mind Perspective model. 
Their model relied on data, collected by Harry Kalven and Hans 
Zeisel, from which the probability of an average juror's voting guilty 
or not guilty can be computed.75 Utilizing the Independent-Mind Per-
spective, however, twelve jurors will contemporaneously vote to acquit 
fewer than one in a trillion times, 76 a prediction that is spectacularly 
wrong.77 
As Nagel and Neef recognized, the error lies in the twin assump-
tions underlying their model - that the strength of cases does not 
vary and that jurors act independently of each other. 78 These premises 
contemplate that individual votes to acquit are randomly distributed 
across all juries, a distribution belied by common sense and the Kalven 
and Zeisel data. 79 Consider a spectrum of cases from "strongest" to 
72. 435 U.S. 223 (1978). 
73. 435 U.S. at 238. 
74. 435 U.S. at 237-38. The Ballew Court cited numerous empirical studies in addition to a 
statistical model by Stuart Nagel and Marian Neef that we will discuss infra notes 75-81 and 
accompanying text. 
75. Nagel and Neef calculated the probability that an average juror will vote guilty to be 
96.4% by working backwards from the national average conviction rate of 64% as reported by 
Kalven and Zeisel. See Nagel & Neef, supra note 33, at 941; KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 1, at 
58. If each juror will vote guilty 96.4% of the time and all jurors vote without deliberation and 
thus independently of each other, 12 jurors will vote guilty contemporaneously 64% of the time 
(96.4% raised to the twelfth power). The probability that an average juror will vote to acquit an 
average defendant would thus be 3.6% (100%-96.4%). 
76. This is the chance of any one juror voting not guilty, 3.6%, raised to the twelfth power. 
See supra note 75. 
77. The nationwide probability of jury acquittal, according to the Kalven and Zeisel data, is 
roughly 33%. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 1, at 58. This means that a trillion verdicts 
will contain roughly three hundred billion acquittals, rather than fewer than one, as would follow 
from the Nagel and Neef Independent-Mind Model. 
78. See Nagel & Neef, supra note 33, at 942-43; see also MICHAEL 0. FINKEISTEIN & 
BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 129-32 (1990) (questioning the accuracy of Nagel and 
Neef model). 
79. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 1, at 58. 
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"weakest." "Strongest" cases are those that would require no deliber-
ation to achieve a unanimous guilty verdict; "weakest" cases are those 
that would require no deliberation to achieve a unanimous acquittal. 
Given a sufficiently large sample of cases, this spectrum will contain 
many points between "strongest" and "weakest." As the points grow 
more distant from the "strongest" end, the cases will require more 
deliberation; at some point, no amount of deliberation will change 
enough jurors' minds to avoid a hung jury. As the points continue 
toward the "weakest" end of the spectrum, deliberation will eventually 
produce an acquittal, with less and less deliberation again required 
along the spectrum. 
Although we do not know how many cases correspond to any 
point along the spectrum, not guilty votes obviously begin to occur at 
some distance from the "strongest" end, become unchangeable by de-
liberation at least by the hung jury juncture, 80 and appear in larger 
numbers as the points approach the "weakest" end. 81 Because the not 
guilty votes are clustered at the "weakest" end of the spectrum, ac-
quittals will occur much more frequently than they would if the not 
guilty votes were distributed randomly across the entire spectrum. 
The spectrum metaphor also suggests that jury size and required vot-
ing majority critically affect only those cases that stand some distance 
from the "strongest" and "weakest" ends. 
1. Majority Control Theory 
A close-call-but-innocent defendant is one who would receive just 
enough votes of not guilty from society to avoid conviction. Under the 
majority control theory, society is equally divided over the guilt of 
close-call-but-innocent defendants. Since a 50% guilty vote falls just 
shy of the requisite controlling percentage for conviction, these de-
fendants, by definition, should be acquitted. 
We wish in this section to determine the risk that a jury vote in 
favor of conviction will result when society is evenly divided over 
guilt. In statistical terms, we will measure the probability of picking 
any particular jury vote in favor of guilt (for example, 9-3) from a 
universe that is split 50-50. Admittedly, the risk of error for these 
defendants will be higher than for the total universe of defendants, 
80. If a jurisdiction permits a nonunanimous verdict, some not-guilty votes could become 
unchangeable prior to the hung jury point. 
81. Nagel and Neef attempted to compensate for the cluster phenomenon by combining the 
Independent-Mind model with a Collective-Mind model. This modification did not, however, 
permit the construction of a formula for optimal jury size in jurisdictions allowing 
nonunanimous verdicts. See Nagel & Neef, supra note 33,.at 968-69. 
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because the total universe contains many defendants who would re-
ceive more than a 50% societal vote for acquittal. Obviously, the risk 
of picking a 9-3 ·sample in favor of guilt from a universe that is only 
50% in favor of acquittal is much higher than if the universe is 99% in 
favor of acquittal. We will address the question of risk of error for the 
total universe of defendants in the next section. 
A statistical model capable of determining the risk of convicting 
close-call-but-innocent defendants resembles a simple coin flip. 82 The 
probability that a balanced coin will land heads when flipped is 50%. 
Likewise, the probability of choosing a single guilty vote from an 
evenly divided society is 50%. If heads represents guilty and tails rep-
resents not guilty, each coin flip can equate to a randomly selected 
vote from society. 
Given an evenly balanced coin, the probability in a sample of n 
flips of receiving g heads is displayed in Table 1. This probability 
equates to the likelihood that a close-call-but-innocent defendant, as 
defined by majority control theory, will receive g votes of guilty from a 
jury with n members. 83 For example, the likelihood that a close-call-
but-innocent defendant will receive nine guilty votes from a twelve-
person jury appears in the column labeled 9 and the row labeled 12, a 
probability of 5%.84 
82. At least one other "coin-flipping" model exists in the literature. Saks and Ostrom 
weighted coins to represent various certainties of guilt held by jury members and then calculated 
the likelihood of reaching a verdict for several permutations of jury size and fraction required to 
render a verdict. Michael J. Saks & Thomas M. Ostrom, Jury Size and Consensus Requirements: 
The Laws of Probability v. the Laws of the Land, 1 J. CoNTEMP. L. 163 (1975). For example, if 
all jurors are 80% certain of the defendant's guilt, then their decisionmaking can be represented 
by a coin that will land heads up 80% of the time. Although Saks and Ostrom's model is mathe-
matically correct, it fails to discuss how often each of the various percentages of certainty actu-
ally occurs. This failure makes extrapolating the model's results into data for practical studies 
extremely difficult. See also David F. Walbert, Note, The Effect of Jury Size on the Probability of 
Conviction: An Evaluation of Williams v. Florida, 22 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 529 (1971) (finding 
that less certainty of guilt or innocence is needed for smaller juries to convict or acquit, respec-
tively); cf. infra Table 3 (noting higher percentages of error as jury compositions grow smaller 
and move farther from unanimity). 
83. The formula for calculating the probability of receiving g heads out of n flips of an 
equally weighted coin is (.S8)(.5'"V) (n 1)/(g!)(n-g)!). Virtually any introductory text on statistics 
discusses coin flipping probability. See, e.g., Y. LEON MAKSOUDIAN, PROBABILITY AND STA-
TISTICS, WITII APPLICATIONS 23-30 (1969). 
84. All of our models refer to postdeliberation jurors and, therefore, place no value on delib-
eration. While deliberation among the members of the jury panel might produce ideas that more 
accurately represent society, any attempt to quantify the effects of deliberation would be fruitless. 
By considering only postdeliberation jurors, we also ignore the effect of challenges for cause. 
These challenges eliminate a limited number of jurors who are predisposed to one side or the 
other. In the ideal system, all of society takes part in defining guilt; a defendant's sister would 
have a vote on the ideal jury. There, her overall effect would be minimal within the societal vote, 
but her presence on an actual jury would unfairly affect the outcome. Because challenges for 
cause should eliminate these unfair allotments of power, they should produce a jury more repre-
sentative of society, thus justifying our decision to ignore any effect they might have on the risk 
of error. 
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TABLE 1 
CHANCE OF CONVICTING CLOSE-CALL-BUT-INNOCENT 
DEFENDANT 
MAJORITY CONTROL 
(All figures rounded to the nearest percent) 
# guilty votes (g) 
#jurors (n) 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
6 9% 2% 
7 16% 5% 1% 
8 22% 11% 3% ** 
9 16% 7% 2% ** 
10 21% 12% 4% 1% ** 
11 23% 16% 8% 3% 1% ** 
12 19% 12% 5% 2% ** ** 
** = less than 1/2 of 1 % 
To compute the total risk of error in a system that permits 
nonunanimous verdicts requires summing of the risks of error for each 
possible verdict. As noted, a close-call-but-innocent defendant will re-
ceive a 9-3 vote of guilty 5% of the time. The chance that the same 
defendant will receive a 10-2 vote is 2%, while the probability of either 
an 11-1or12-0 vote is less than 1/2of1 %. Adding these percentages, 
the probability that a close-call-but-innocent defendant will be con-
victed in a system that permits 9-3, 10-2, 11-1, and 12-0 guilty verdicts 
is 7% (5% + 2% + 0% + 0%).85 A system that permits 5-1and6-0 
verdicts will convict 11% (9% + 2%) of close-call-but-innocent 
defendants. 
The lowest risks of error, unsurprisingly, are associated with unan-
imous verdicts. Unanimous juries have a risk of error of less than 1/2 
of 1 % as long as they consist of more than seven members, and even a 
six-member unanimous jury has only a 2% chance of error. A jury 
consisting of twelve members that requires a vote of 11-1 or 12-0 also 
has a negligible chance of error. 86 
2. Two-Thirds Control Approach 
Recall that the close-call-but-innocent defendant would receive 
just enough votes of acquittal to avoid conviction. While under the 
majority control theory the close-call defendant contemplates an 
evenly divided society, under the two-thirds control theory, one vote 
more than 33-1/3% of society in the defendant's favor is a close-call-
85. We counted less than 1/2 of 1 % as 0% when summing the probabilities. 
86. By negligible, we mean less than 1/2 of 1 %. 
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but-innocent defendant. The pertinent test for error again resembles a 
coin flip. In a two-thirds control system, however, the coin must be 
weighted in a manner that causes it to land heads up 66.6% of the 
time. 87 Allowing heads to represent guilty and tails to represent not 
guilty, each coin flip equates to a randomly selected vote from a soci-
ety 66.6% of whose members would vote for conviction and 33.4% for 
acquittal. 
Given such a weighted coin, the probability in a sample of n flips of 
receiving g heads appears in Table 2. This is the probability that a 
close-call-but-innocent defendant, as defined by two-thirds control 
theory, will receive g votes of guilty from a jury with n members.BB 
TABLE 2 
CHANCE OF CONVICTING CLOSE-CALL-BUT INNOCENT 
DEFENDANT 
Two-THIRDS CONTROL 
(All figures rounded to the nearest percent) 
# guilty votes (g) 
#jurors (n) 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
6 26% 8% 
7 30% 20% 5% 
8 27% 15% 4% 
9 23% 11% 2% 
10 26% 19% 8% 2% 
11 23% 15% 6% 1% 
12 24% 21% 12% 4% 1% 
The risk of error with regard to the close-call-but-innocent defend-
ant is significantly higher in the two-thirds control model than in the 
majority control model. 89 As Table 2 demonstrates, a system permit-
ting 9-3, 10-2, 11-1, and 12-0 verdicts has a total risk of error of 38% 
(21% + 12% + 4% + 1%). A system permitting 6-0 verdicts has 
an 8% chance of erroneously convicting a close-call defendant.9° 
87. The coin should actually land heads-up an infinitesimal amount less than 66-2/3% of the 
time. We have used 66.6% for convenience in calculation. Even if we could calculate this infini· 
tesimal, it would not change our risk-of-error calculations. 
88. The probability of receiving g heads out of n flips of a coin weighted to land heads up 
66% of the time is (.66')(.341"V) (nl)/(gl)(n-g)I). See supra note 83. 
89. This is because the 66-2/3% supermajority standard is a more difficult threshold to cross. 
Consider all convicted defendants who have 33-1/3% to 49.9% of society in their favor. Those 
guilty verdicts are correct under a majority standard but incorrect under the 66-2/3% 
supermajority standard. Because more verdicts are incorrect under supermajority, the risk of 
error appears larger in Table 2 than in Table 1. 
90. Even a 12-member jury that requires unanimity will reach an erroneous verdict 1 % of 
the time under the two-thirds control model. 
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Thus, the Johnson and Williams Courts implicitly adopted a policy 
consistent with majority control theory when they approved verdicts 
of 9-3 and 6-0. The risk of error for these jury verdicts under majority 
control theory is much less controversial (7% and 2%, respectively) 
than under two-thirds control (38% and 8%). 
These statistics do not reflect what percentage of all defendants are 
close-call-but-innocent defendants. If this percentage is small, our 
coin-flip model has limited value, and the necessities of judicial econ-
omy could take priority over protecting the few close-call-but-innocent 
defendants.91 The Sample Accuracy Model, which follows, overcomes 
the problem of unknown distribution. 
B. The Sample Accuracy Model (SAM) 
The mathematically ideal method of testing jury configurations 
would be to poll society after every verdict. As a thought experiment, 
assume that society sits as a jury in a large number of criminal cases; 
the votes in each case will, in theory, constitute a distribution along a 
scale from 0% guilty to 100% guilty. Because only a very few defend-
ants who are clearly innocent will be prosecuted, however, we will 
assume a distribution from 20% to 100%.92 We also assume in this 
section that a sufficiently large number of prosecutions will produce 
the same number of votes at each percentage from 20% to 100% - a 
uniform distribution of data points.93 
91. Data collected by Kalven and Zeisel indicate that the number of close-call defendants is 
fairly large; they found that judges considered 43% of criminal cases "close." KAI.VEN & 
ZEISEL, supra note 1, at 134. 
92. We drew the 20% figure from the procedure in ancient Greece that sanctioned prosecu-
tors ifless than 20% of the very large Greekjuries voted guilty. See ZERMAN, supra note 42, at 
17. Data collected by Kalven and Zeisel confirm that only a small number of clearly innocent 
defendants are prosecuted. KAI.VEN & ZEISEL, supra note 1, at 134-35. While the 20% bench-
mark for "clearly innocent" is admittedly arbitrary, small changes in this figure - for example, 
using 15% or 25% - would not generate significant changes in the results our model produces. 
Similarly, no data points may exist at 100%, for the reasons offered in note 67, supra, but the use 
of 95% or 99% as the top of the range would not significantly change our results. 
93. No data exist to confirm or reject this empirical assumption. We believe that prosecutors 
will probably charge more cases in the upper reaches of the range. We also believe that fewer 
and fewer such cases exist as the percentages of guilty votes near 100%. Thus, a normal distribu-
tion (bell curve) with a mean between 70%-80% might best describe the universe of cases prose-
cutors file. But we must consider the effect of plea bargaining. Again, lacking data, we surmise 
that the incentives to plea bargain are strongest in cases near the mean; both sides have some-
thing to gain by bargaining and something to lose by going to trial. The weaker the evidence, the 
less incentive defendants have to plea bargain; when the evidence is strong enough to convince 
percentages of society that approach 100%, prosecutors have little incentive to bargain. Plea 
bargaining, therefore, may flatten the curve of cases that go to trial to something approaching a 
uniform distribution. 
Professor David Edelman, Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Sydney, 
assisted us in performing tests on distributions other than a uniform distribution. These tests 
demonstrated that other distributions had lower risks of error than SAM. For example, Profes-
sor Edelman generated results based on a normal distribution centered at approximately 60% 
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Because we are concerned for the moment only with the risk of 
erroneous convictions, consider that any jury panel conviction would 
be erroneous under the majority control theory if 50% or less of soci-
ety would have voted guilty in a postverdict vote. We therefore want 
to know the likelihood that 50% or less of society would vote guilty 
when a particular jury configuration in favor of guilt occurs. Given 
our assumptions, we know two facts about our universe when we test a 
jury configuration: how often 50% or less of society votes guilty;94 
and the jury configuration we are testing. From these facts, our Sam-
ple Accuracy Model (SAM) computes the probability that 50% or less 
of society would have voted guilty given a particular jury 
configuration. 95 
We are not testing a particular vote in a particular case to deter-
mine whether it coincides with society's view.96 Rather, we want to 
estimate the likelihood that a particular configuration in favor of guilt, 
say 9-3, will be drawn from a universe that would have acquitted the 
defendant. 97 This probability is the risk of error for systems that per-
and two beta-distributions with peaks at just below and just above 80%. The risks of error of a 
9-3 verdict ranged from 1.0% to 4.5% in these models, while SAM indicates a 4.6% risk of 
error. The risks of error listed in Table 3, therefore, can be viewed as an upper range-the 
highest likely risk of error. The results of the other calculations are available from the authors. 
94. This probability is 37.5%. We assumed that cases that would generate guilty votes of 
20% or less are not prosecuted; thus, the only data points in our universe are those from 20% to 
100%. In that universe, given the assumed.uniform distribution, the points from 20% to 50% 
constitute 3/8 or 37.5% of the total points. If we knew nothing else about this universe, we 
would know that the chances of a societal vote of 50% or less in favor of guilt is 37.5%. 
95. The mathematical tool for making this computation is Bayes' Theorem, which provides 
p(A; I B;) = 
P(B; I Ai)P(Ai) 
::SiP(B; I Ai)P(Ai) 
See FINKELSfEIN & LEVIN, supra note 78, at 93. 
96. Use of Bayes' Theorem, see supra note 95, to produce a probabilistic estimate of the facts 
in a particular case is controversial. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil 
Trials, 66 B.U. L. REv. 401 (1986); Paul Bergman & Al Moore, Mistrial by Likelihood Ratio: 
Bayesian Analysis Meets the F-Word, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 589 (1991}; Stephen E. Feinberg & 
Mark J. Schervish, The Relevance of Bayesian Inference for the Presentation of Statistical Evi· 
dence and for Legal Decisionmaking, 66 B.U. L. REv. 771 (1986); Michael 0. Finkelstein & 
William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489 
(1970); D.H. Kaye, Credal Probability, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 647 (1991); Bernard Robertson & 
G.A. Vignaux, Extending the Conversation About Bayes, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 629 (1991}; David 
A. S ... hum, Probability and the Processes of Discovery, Proof, and Choice, 66 B.U. L. REV. 825 
(1986); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 
HARV. L. REv. 1329 (1971). We are not using Bayes' Theorem as an adjunct to ascertaining the 
"true" state of facts in a particular case; rather, we use it to evaluate the operation of jury config-
uration rules on a system-wide basis. See Richard O. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 15 MICH. L. 
REv. 1021, 1022 (1977) (using Bayes' Theorem to evaluate "legal rules that involve weighing 
evidence in an essentially probabilistic fashion"). 
97. We thank Professor David Edelman, Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Univer-
sity of Sydney, for his critique of an earlier model of SAM and for his verification of the model 
that appears in the text. We originally created a model that used the student t-test to estimate 
the probability of drawing a particular jury sample from a universe where 50% or less would 
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mit the configuration. For example, Table 3 displays the probability 
that 9-3 votes in favor of guilt are derived from a society with fifty 
percent or less of its members in favor of conviction - not-guilty de-
fendants under the majority control theory. Likewise, Table 3 dis-
plays the probability that 9-3 verdicts in favor of guilt derive from a 
society less than two thirds of whose members favor conviction - not-
guilty defendants under the two-thirds control theory. 
SAM thus displays the probability that actual juries favor guilt by 
particular fractions although society as a whole would acquit (by each 
of the two standards we developed earlier). 
have voted to convict. We did this by extrapolating the known mean and variance of a given 
sample (a given jury configuration) into the probable mean and variance of the sample's source 
universe (society). See generally MAKsOUDIAN, supra note 83, at 187-89. Since guilty and not 
guilty votes are not directly compatible with the numerically oriented student t-test, we con-
verted votes into numbers by allowing a 1 to represent a vote of guilty and a 0 to represent a vote 
of not guilty. For example, conviction by a vote of 9-3 can be converted into a sample of 9 ones 
and 3 zeros. The mean of this sample is • 75, and its variance is approximately .20. The student t-
test produces the probability that such a sample would arise from a universe with a particular 
mean, e.g., .50 or less (indicating acquittal under the majority control theory) or .66 or less 
(indicating acquittal under the two-thirds control theory). 
Although use of the student t-test when dealing with binomial distributions (for example, 
guilty-not guilty) suffers from some mathematical difficulties, see, e.g., David Edelman, Bounds 
for a Nonparametric T-Table, BIOMETRIKA, Apr. 1986, at 242, courts have accepted its use in 
some circumstances. See, e.g., Moultrie v. Martin, 690 F.2d 1078, 1082 (4th Cir. 1982). The 
results of this earlier SAM closely tracked those of the SAM we ultimately developed (results are 
available from the authors). 
CJ 
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TABLE 3 
SAMPLE ACCURACY MODEL (SAM) 
Risk That Particular Configurations for Guilt 
Result When Society Would Acquit 
(All figures rounded to nearest 1/10 percent) 
Risks of Error 
Jury Size Verdict Majority Two-thirds 
5 5-0 1.6% 8.7% 
5 4-1 10.8% 35.0% 
6 6-0 .8% 5.8% 
6 5-1 6.2% 26.3% 
7 7-0 .4% 3.9% 
7 6-1 3.5% 19.5% 
7 5-2 14.4% 46.7% 
8 8-0 .2% 2.6% 
8 7-1 2.0% 14.3% 
8 6-2 9.0% 37.7% 
9 9-0 ** 1.7% 
9 8-1 1.1% 10.4% 
9 7-2 5.5% 29.9% 
9 6-3 17.2% 55.8% 
10 10-0 ** 1.1% 
10 9-1 .6% 7.5% 
10 8-2 3.3% 23.4% 
10 7-3 11.1% 47.2% 
11 11-0 ** .8% 
11 10-1 .3% 5.4% 
11 9-2 1.9% 18.1% 
11 8-3 7.3% 39.3% 
11 7-4 19.4% 63.1% 
12 12-0 ** .5% 
12 11-1 .2% 3.8% 
12 10-2 1.1% 13.8% 
12 9-3 4.6% 32.2% 
12 8-4 13.4% 55.1% 
12 7-5 29.1% 75.6% 
** = less than 0.1 %. 
We believe that SAM reflects, with reasonable accuracy, the upper 
bounds of the risk of error in various verdicts. One reason SAM re-
fleets an upper bound is that our assumption about a uniform distribu-
tion of data points between 20% and 100% may be too conservative. 
If the actual distribution is weighted toward the high end (under the 
assumption that prosecutors will be more likely to bring stronger cases 
to trial), the risk of error will generally be lower.9s 
98. See supra note 93. 
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Moreover, the SAM risks of error for the nonunanimous verdicts 
apply to those verdicts alone and do not reflect the lesser risk of error 
for other permissible verdicts. While we summed the risks of error in 
Tables 1 and 2 to obtain the total risk of error for systems that permit 
nonunanimous verdicts,99 precisely the reverse mathematical relation-
ship exists in the SAM risks of error. SAM takes all 9-3 verdicts and 
calculates what percentage of those verdicts would receive less than a 
majority vote from society. Whatever the chance of error in a 9-3 
verdict of guilty, for example, the chance of error in a 10-2 guilty ver-
dict must be lower. Because a system that permits 9-3 verdicts will 
also obtain convictions on 10-2, 11-1, and 12-0 verdicts, the total risk 
of error for all samples drawn from the universe will be a weighted 
average of all four risks of error100 and thus lower than the risk for a 9-
3 verdict. 101 
As we do not know the distribution of the various permissible con-
figurations, we cannot calculate the total risk of error. 102 All we can 
state with certainty is that a system that permits 9-3 verdicts will have 
a total risk of error, under majority control, of less than 4.6% and 
more than 0%. Thus, SAM's risk-of-error estimates are substantially 
lower than those of the coin-flip model. Allowing a 9-3 verdict entails 
a 7% risk in the coin-flip (majority) model and less than a 4.6% risk in 
SAM. Similarly, allowing a 5-1 verdict has a 11 % risk in the coin-flip 
(majority) model and less than a 6.2% risk in SAM. SAM produces a 
lower risk of error because it considers all defendants, not just the 
close-call-but-innocent ones. Some defendants from the total universe 
of prosecuted defendants will be obviously not guilty, and the jury 
panel will be unlikely to make a mistake in those cases. 
Regardless of the precision of the final numbers, SAM provides a 
useful comparative tool. While we do not claim that a system permit-
ting 9-3 verdicts has a precise 4.6% risk of error under majority con-
trol theory, we can comfortably claim that the risk of error in a 9-3 
system significantly exceeds that in a system that permits 8-2, 7-1, or 
6-1 verdicts. This kind of comparison should prove useful. A legisla-
ture which already permits 9-3 verdicts might want to know whether 
99. See supra notes 85, 89-90 and accompanying text. 
100. The average will be weighted by the actual frequency of each configuration. 
101. By contrast, the coin-flip model sums a series of binomial probabilities; each coin-flip 
exercise is independent of all others. Thus, the chance of flipping nine heads in twelve tries does 
not include the chance of flipping ten or eleven heads in twelve tries. In effect, the risks of error 
must be summed in the coin-flip model but averaged in SAM. 
102. Our spectrum metaphor, see supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text, leads us to as-
sume that a system would have more 9-3 verdicts than 10-2, 11-1, or 12-0 verdicts. If that is 
right, the total risk of error would be closer to 4.6% than to 0%. 
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economies could be achieved, without loss of accuracy, by permitting 
6-1 verdicts. SAM discloses that while 6-1 produces a smaller risk of 
error than 9-3, 6-0 is far more accurate than either. 
Social scientists typically require a risk of error of 5% or less to 
confirm a statistical hypothesis. 103 In Table 3, the majority control 
model produces an upper bound risk of error of less than 5% for all 
nontraditional jury configurations that the Supreme Court has ap-
proved. Six to zero is 0.8%, 9-3 is 4.6%, 10-2 is 1.1%, and 11-1 is 
0.2%. 104 We argued earlier that the majority control standard made 
both practical and epistemological sense, and Table 3 demonstrates 
that it makes jurisprudential sense as we11.1os 
However, none of our statistical work requires acceptance of the 
Court's demarcations. Even readers who accept majority control as 
the appropriate standard might believe that the 4.6% upper bound for 
risk of error associated with 9-3 verdicts is too high. Consider a juris-
diction that permits 9-3 verdicts and conducts 1000 criminal trials in a 
year. Using Kalven and Zeisel's averages, 640 defendants will be con-
victed. If the verdicts are evenly distributed among 9-3, 10-2, 11-1, 
and 12-0,106 the average risk of error will be 1.5%, and ten innocent 
defendants will be convicted. As a policy matter, ten erroneous con-
victions may be too high a price to pay for whatever marginal efficien-
cies are achieved by permitting 9-3 verdicts. If the jurisdiction drew 
the line at 10-2 verdicts, only three innocent defendants would be con-
victed. Eleven to one would yield, on average, only one erroneous 
conviction per year. 
Whatever view one takes on this policy question, Table 3 draws a 
reasonably clear line between the configurations that the Court has 
approved, those that it has rejected, and those with which states might 
experiment. For example, SAM provides an answer to the question 
posed in the Introduction, whether any principle could justify uphold-
ing 9-3 but not 5-1 verdicts.107 Although it may seem counterintui-
103. See Nagel & Neef, supra note 33, at 943 n.17 ("The 0.95 probability level [or 5% risk of 
error] is customarily used in social science to determine whether an hypothesis has been con· 
firmed; in discussing that level, statisticians sometimes analogize to criminal case decision· 
making."). 
104. The Court rejected 5-0 verdicts in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978). SAM gener-
ates a small risk of error for 5-0 verdicts (1.6% ), but Ballew was, in large part, predicated on the 
dwindling opportunity for minority participation in smaller juries. See 435 U.S. at 241. 
105. As noted with respect to the close-call model, the large risks of error associated with the 
two-thirds control theory suggest that the Supreme Court jurisprudence can be statistically vali· 
dated only under majority control theory. 
106. When we assume a distribution in the text, we assume a postdeliberation verdict, which 
is the same assumption underlying SAM. 
107. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. 
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tive, a 9-3 verdict has a significantly lower risk of error than 5-1 ( 4.6% 
versus 6.2%). SAM also leaves no doubt that the constitutional line 
should be drawn at 9-3 because an 8-4 verdict produces a clearly unac-
ceptable risk of error of 13.4%. 
Our analysis ignores the possibility that error may occur when the 
jury does not hear relevant, exculpatory evidence. Several factors, 
some of them benign, can cause exculpatory evidence not to be 
presented.108 When this occurs, the error rate will be higher than 
when computed as a function of how society would have voted had it 
heard a full evidentiary presentation. Thus, even though SAM dis-
closes a risk of error of less than 0.1 % for unanimous verdicts of nine 
or more jurors, we would expect the actual error rate to be higher 
when judged by the standard of the fully informed society. As our 
project is to compare various jury configurations, rather than compute 
the actual rate of error, we have assumed throughout that the jury and 
society hear the same evidence.109 
In sum, our :findings provide support for the Supreme Court's jury 
configuration jurisprudence. But they also raise a troubling and novel 
question that the Court has not addressed. If any state can accept a 9-
3 vote for conviction as sufficiently accurate, are not all states required 
to give legal effect to a 9-3 vote in favor of acquittal? Presumably, the 
two votes would be equally accurate. In states that require unanimous 
verdicts, therefore, refusing to recognize a 9-3 vote of guilty may be a 
matter of grace, but votes of 9-3 or higher in favor of acquittal should 
be treated as an acquittal. The next Part examines this question. 
V. DE FACTO ACQUITTAL 
The Supreme Court maintains that substance is more important 
than form in determining whether a defendant has been acquitted. 
108. The factors include neglect, incompetence, and bad fai$ on the part of the police, the 
prosecutor, and the judge; defense counsel neglect and incompetence; witness bad faith, loss of 
memory, or inept performance; and the rigid application of rules of evidence. 
109. Our analysis also ignores any state interest in judicial economy that impaneling smaller 
juries or avoiding hung juries might achieve. We believe, however, that judicial economy should 
be accorded no weight in the balance of interests unless the jury configuration has an acceptable 
risk of error. Cf Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 139 (1979) (rejecting a judicial economy 
argument in support of a nonunanimous six-person jury and commenting that "when a State 
[jury system] ..• sufficiently threatens the constitutional principles that led to the establishment 
of the [jury] size threshold ••. any countervailing interest of the State should yield"). Conced-
edly, any risk of error poses both benefits and detriments for defendants. A 9-3 verdict of guilty 
may arbitrarily convict a defendant who should be acquitted, while a 9-3 verdict of not guilty 
may acquit a defendant who should be convicted. While the risks might be balanced, erroneous 
convictions offend the integrity of our criminal justice system and should be avoided whenever 
practicable. Moreover, the benefit of the 9-3 verdicts is conferred only upon those persons who 
are, by definition, guilty. 
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The issue is not whether the judge or jury uttered the magic word 
acquittal but, instead, whether the outcome constitutes a resolution of 
the facts in the defendant's favor. 110 In upholding 9-3 verdicts, the 
Court has expressly held that they constitute a constitutionally ade-
quate and accurate resolution of the facts. 111 Thus, a 9-3 verdict in 
favor of the defendant is, in substance, an acquittal. The question is 
whether states may refuse to recognize a 9-3 acquittal by adopting a 
requirement of unanimity for acquittals as well as convictions. While 
states are free to insist on a 12-0 standard for conviction, they may be 
constitutionally obligated to recognize a 9-3 verdict in favor of the 
defendant as a de facto acquittal. 
This type of system would be procedurally asymmetrical. If a state 
requires a unanimous verdict to convict, procedural symmetry would 
require the same standard for acquittal. But a more powerful symme-
try favors our de facto argument - the symmetry of substance rather 
than form. Our premise is that a 9-3 verdict has a sufficiently low risk 
of error that it accurately represents how society as a whole would 
have voted. If society would almost certainly have acquitted a 9-3 
defendant, the symmetry we prefer is between what society would 
have done and what the legal system is required to do. 
Calling a 9-3 verdict for acquittal anything other than an acquittal 
indulges the assumption that a state may recharacterize an adequate 
and accurate factual resolution as a nonresolution. If a state may thus 
use procedure to efface substance, might it not also characterize a 12-0 
vote to acquit as a "failure to convict," thus permitting the reprosecu-
tion of all defendants who are not convicted on the first attempt? 
While this scenario seems bizarre, we are at a loss to see how it is 
distinguishable from a 9-3 favorable verdict, given our statistical con-
firmation of the Court's view that a 9-3 verdict is both adequate and 
accurate. 
The response to the procedural symmetry argument is that the 
states that require unanimity may achieve symmetry by amending 
their rules of procedure to allow 9-3, 10-2, and 11-1 verdicts. Of 
course, symmetry is not always desirable. Proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is an asymmetrical requirement in our system because a wrong-
ful acquittal is preferable to a wrongful conviction.112 In that light, 
states might want to require unanimity for conviction but permit 9-3 
110. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978); see also Sanabria v. United States, 437 
U.S. 54 (1978) (holding insufficient evidence dismissal to be an acquittal even though judge erred 
in suppressing some of government's evidence). 
111. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 360 (1972). 
112. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). This is not to say that the reasonable doubt 
standard requires certain jury votes. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, 
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verdicts to establish an acquittal. In any event, this asymmetry would 
probably cost the system very little. If a 9-3 verdict in favor of acquit-
tal represents the judgment of society, subject to a risk of error that is 
less than 4.6%, then the chance that a second jury would return a 
unanimous vote of conviction is quite small. 
While recognizing 9-3 verdicts as sufficient to constitute an acquit-
tal is thus a low-cost venture for the state, not recognizing these ver-
dicts exacts a potentially exorbitant cost from individual defendants. 
Assuming additional deliberation does not persuade the three dissent-
ing jurors to change their votes, the defendant who demonstrates his 
innocence within a 4.6% risk of error will receive a hung jury mistrial. 
The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause permits a second trial following a hung jury mistrial, 113 and the 
9-3 "de facto acquitted" defendant thus confronts precisely the di-
lemma the Court condemned in a slightly different context: 
[T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to 
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, 
thereby subjecting hint to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and com-
pelling hint to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well 
as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found 
guilty.114 
To be sure, the prosecutor may intuitively recognize what our 
models demonstrate - that the verdict represents what any other jury 
would likely do - and decline to prosecute. But two reasons counsel 
against relying on prosecutorial discretion. First, the prosecutor may 
be willing to take her chances, so even if the outcome is the same, the 
defendant has suffered the ordeal of the second trial. 115 Second, the 
prosecutor may be able to improve her case and obtain a guilty verdict 
against a defendant who received a de facto acquittal from the first 
jury. Indeed, in Ashe v. Swenson, 116 the State turned a unanimous ac-
quittal into a unanimous guilty verdict. While this outcome (one not 
guilty verdict, one guilty verdict) raises questions about which jury 
verdict is the "true" one, the Supreme Court hinted in Ashe that the 
the reasonable doubt standard does support the use of asymmetrical procedures that benefit the 
defendant. 
113. See, e.g., Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317 (1984); Logan v. United States, 144 
U.S. 263 (1892); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824). 
114. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). Green held that conviction of a 
lesser-included offense constitutes an implied acquittal of the greater offense so long as the jury 
could have convicted on the greater. Although Green is thus technically distinguishable, the 
distinction disappears if a 9-3 verdict for acquittal is recognized as an acquittal in substance. 
115. See George C. Thomas III, The Prohibition of Successive Prosecutions for the Same Of-
fense: In Search of a Definition, 71 low A L. REv. 323, 325-26 (1986) (noting that prohibiting 
repeated prosecutions is an essential element of protection against governmental tyranny). 
116. 397 U.S. 436 (1970). 
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prosecutor may have manipulated the second prosecution in a way 
inconsistent with the "true" facts. 117 
Regardless of which set of facts is "true," the Double Jeopardy 
Clause exists to prevent a second trial following an acquittal. 118 Thus, 
we conclude that a defendant who receives nine not guilty votes must 
be treated for all purposes as acquitted, since the jury vote reflects a 
sufficient likelihood that society would consider her not guilty.119 
There remains but one problem - identifying defendants who receive 
a 9-3 vote for acquittal. State law could, of course, specify that a 9-3 
vote for acquittal is an acquittal. But in states that require unanimity, 
a jury would likely report a hung jury without disclosing the vote. A 
simple solution would be to poll the jury once a judge concluded that 
the jury was hopelessly deadlocked. In effect, recognizing that a 9-3 
vote for acquittal is a constitutionally mandated acquittal creates an 
ancillary right to have a hung jury polled. 
Support for the right to poll the jury can be found in Burks v. 
United States. 120 The Court held in Burks that a conviction found by 
an appellate court to rest on insufficient evidence must be treated as an 
acquittal. We believe that a 9-3 jury split in favor of the defendant is a 
finding of insufficient evidence because our models show that this ver-
dict almost certainly represents what a majority of society would be-
lieve if fa_ced with the same proof. If a finding of insufficient evidence 
can thus be lurking in a hung jury, the Due Process Clause should 
entail the right to poll the jury as a way of preventing potential Double 
Jeopardy Clause violations.121 
117. The Court noted that the state's witnesses' testimony was, the second time around, 
"substantially stronger on the issue of [defendant's] identity" - the sole contested issue in both 
trials. 397 U.S. at 440. Moreover, the Court commented, "The State further refined its case at 
the second trial by declining to call one of the [witnesses] whose identification testimony at the 
first trial had been conspicuously negative." 397 U.S. at 440. The Court also quoted from the 
state's brief that the prosecutor "did what every good attorney would do - he refined his presen· 
tation in light of the turn of events at the first trial." 397 U.S. at 447. The Court characterized 
this as treating "the first trial as no more than a dry run for the second prosecution •••• " 397 
U.S. at447. 
118. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. Hence, a second trial following a 9·3 
acquittal vote is not an independent event tied to its own hypothetical society-wide evaluation of 
the evidence presented in the second trial. If our de facto acquittal argument is correct, the 9·3 
verdict was an acquittal, and the second trial should never have occurred. 
119. Other de facto acquittals would be 10-2 and 11-1. See supra Table 3. 
120. 437 U.S. 1 (1978). 
121. The right to appeal a judge's refusal to poll the jury must also follow. If a trial judge is 
constitutionally required to take certain action at trial, the violation of that duty is grounds for 
appeal. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) (reversing defendant's conviction be· 
cause trial judge refused properly to instruct jury on state's constitutionally imposed burden of 
proof); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (reversing conviction because trial judge told 
jurors they could draw negative inference from defendant's exercise of constitutional right not to 
testify). 
October 1992] Guilt, Juries, and Jeopardy 31 
A potential doctrinal roadblock exists, however. In Richardson v. 
United States 122 the Court held that a hung jury does not terminate 
jeopardy and that, therefore, a defendant cannot raise a double jeop-
ardy defense regardless of the cause of the hung jury. The Richardson 
procedural bar means that a defendant cannot even be heard on a 
claim that insufficient evidence caused the jury to hang. If a jurisdic-
tion labels a 9-3 verdict for acquittal a hung jury, Richardson seems to 
hold that jeopardy has not terminated and, by implication, that a de-
fendant cannot assert that the vote was equivalent to an acquittal. 
We do not believe, however, that Richardson should be read so 
rigidly. The Court's rationale, to the extent it had one, 123 follows from 
the premise that a hung jury is not a verdict. Absent a verdict, the 
Court concluded, the defendant could point to no "event which termi-
nates jeopardy."124 As the Court noted in a case doctrinally similar to 
Richardson, "[t]he conceptual difficulty for [the defendant] is that he 
has not been acquitted; he simply maintains that he ought to have 
been."125 Moreover, absent a verdict, no appeal would normally oc-
cur, and no other mechanism exists to review the adequacy of the 
state's proof. Richardson, in effect, asked the Court to create an addi-
tional level of quasi-appellate review for hung jury mistrial defendants. 
Our 9-3 acquittal argument avoids both of the problems that 
plagued Richardson. We do not demand that the record be examined 
to determine whether the state's case is insufficient as a matter of law 
and, if so, that this legal judgment supplant the verdictless trial out-
come. Instead, we argue that the 9-3 defendant received a de facto 
acquittal from the jury acting as factfinder. Thus, our 9-3 defendant 
can point to a verdict that terminates jeopardy in her favor. If the 
balance of our argument is accepted, a constitutional right to poll the 
jury must follow. 
Once the jury has been polled, we believe the judge must enter an 
acquittal if the vote is 9-3 or higher in favor of acquittal. Judges al-
122. 468 U.S. 317 (1984). 
123. See Thomas, supra note 12, at 861-62 (criticizing Richardson). 
124. 468 U.S. at 325. 
125. Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 307 (1984). Lydon is, we be-
lieve, indistinguishable from Richardson. In Lydon, the defendant was convicted in the first tier 
of a two-tier system, exercised his right to void the conviction by requesting a trial de nova, and 
then sought to demonstrate that the voided conviction had been based on insufficient evidence. 
The Court held that Lydon, like Richardson, had no right to a judicial determination of the 
sufficiency of the evidence. Although Lydon acted to vacate the verdict in his case, while Rich-
ardson never received a verdict, the analysis in both cases turns on the lack of a verdict that 
would support a double jeopardy claim. See generally Thomas, supra note 12 (arguing that a 
valid double jeopardy claim requires an acquittal, an extant conviction, or a prior event that is 
equivalent to a verdict). 
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ready possess the power to enter acquittals when juries are hung. 126 
Our argument simply creates a rationale for entering an acquittal that 
extends beyond the traditional notion of legally insufficient evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
By permitting nonunanimous decisions and small juries, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has risked furthering judicial economy at the expense 
of constitutional interests. High risks of jury error translate into more 
wrongful convictions, which in turn condemn innocent defendants to 
punishment. The burden should rest on the government to show that 
the systems employed do not too often convict innocent defendants. 
Small and nonunanimous juries diminish the probability that a ver-
dict represents the judgment that society as a whole would reach. Be-
cause the opinion of society as a whole best defines the concept of 
guilt, any substantial risk that a jury panel would fail to manifest soci-
ety's view creates a risk of convicting an innocent defendant. Both our 
Close-Call-But-Innocent Defendant Model and our Sample Accuracy 
Model (SAM) indicate that the risks of error created by the Court's 
jury configuration holdings have not been substantial, with the possi-
ble exception of the risk created by 9-3 verdicts. For those unresolved 
configurations, however, a bright line should be drawn to invalidate 
jury configurations correlating to a 5% or greater overall risk of error 
as predicted by SAM. These inadequate configurations include, at a 
minimum, 6-2, 7-2, 7-3, 8-3, and 8-4 verdicts.121 
Moreover, if a 9-3 vote of guilty is sufficiently reliable to permit a 
state to impose a conviction, a vote of 9-3 in favor of acquittal must 
manifest a lack of guilt. Thus, while a jurisdiction may choose to re-
quire unanimity for conviction to ensure as few wrongful convictions 
as possible, no court should permit a second trial if the first one ended 
in the defendant's favor by a vote of 9-3, 10-2, or 11-1. A second trial 
risks a wrongful conviction or, at the very least, the ordeal of a second 
trial prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Implementing this 
principle simply requires a judge to poll the jury at the defendant's 
request and enter a judgment of acquittal if the vote is 9-3 or higher in 
the defendant's favor. 
We have attempted in this article to "begin over again and concen-
trate" by taking a fresh look at the interplay between guilt and jury 
verdicts. Somewhat to our surprise, we discovered that guilt is undefi-
126. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 
(1977). 
127. See supra Table 3. 
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nable without reference to the larger society. We also discovered that 
our risk-of-error experiments implicated the principle of double jeop-
ardy. When we began this thought experiment, we intended only to 
test the risk of error in various jury configurations and verdicts. We 
ended, however, by articulating a more fundamental principle: guilt is 
nothing more, and nothing less, than the judgment of society. Any 
verdict that accurately represents how society would have voted is 
valid, and any acquittal, even if de facto, brings the bar of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause into play. 
